cyberspaceФилософские проблемы информационных технологий и киберпространстваPhilosophical Problems of IT & Cyberspace (PhilIT&C)2305-3763Пятигорский государственный университетcyberspace-162Research ArticleСтатьиВ защиту феноменального сознания: аргументы против физикализма в современной аналитической философии (ЧАСТЬ 2)IN DEFENSE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (PART II)ГаспарянД. Э.GasparyanD. E.dgasparyan@hse.ruНациональный Исследовательский Университет Высшая школа экономикиРоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation201408072021015285Copyright © Гаспарян Д.Э., 20212021Гаспарян Д.Э.Gasparyan D.E.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://cyberspace.pgu.ru/jour/article/view/162

В настоящей статье мы рассмотрим наиболее влиятельные и обсуждаемые антифизикалистские аргументы, ставшие в последнее десятилетие почти культовыми. В программе антифизикализма можно выделить две подпрограммы - негативную и позитивную. В рамках позитивной части ведутся поиски теории, которая могла бы объяснить, каким образом физические процессы в мозге порождают ментальный опыт. В свою очередь, негативная часть направлена на критику главных доводов и положений физикализма (материализма). В данной статье мы сосредоточимся на второй критической части. При этом мы ограничимся изложением тех аргументов, которые призваны показать и отстоять феноменальность сознания. Не имея возможности подробно излагать собственно физикалистские позиции и аргументы, мы будем пояснять их по ходу рассмотрения аргументов антифизикализма. Цель нашей работы довольно скромна - сделать обзор основных феноменалистских аргументов антифизикализма, сопроводив их соответствующим поясняющим комментированием и, по возможности, компактным анализом. Придерживаясь задуманного формата исследования, мы не ставили цели высказывать собственные критические замечания и соображения в связи с рассматриваемыми аргументами, т.к. это не позволило бы уложиться в объем одной статьи.

In this article I shall discuss the most influential and discussed non-physicalistic arguments, which became almost iconic in the last. Non physicalistic programs can be divided into negative and positive subprograms. There is the question “how physical processes in the brain cause mental experiences?” in the framework of the positive subprogram. In turn, the negative part is mean to critique the main arguments and the provisions of the physicalism. In this article I’m going to focus on the second negative subprogram. I will limit myself to outlining the arguments, which aim to demonstrate and defend phenomenal consciousness. Not having the opportunity to recount specific physicalistic positions and arguments, I would bring them during the review of the non-physicalistic arguments. The purpose of my work is rather modest - I’m going to do a review of the main non-physicalistic arguments, accompanied by their respective explanatory commenting and, if possible, compact analysis. Adhering to the planned format of the research, I did not pursue the goal to provide this research with my own critical comments and suggestions, because it would not meet the scope of the article.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.