cyberspaceФилософские проблемы информационных технологий и киберпространстваPhilosophical Problems of IT & Cyberspace (PhilIT&C)2305-3763Пятигорский государственный университет10.17726/philIT.2018.1.1cyberspace-3Research ArticleСтатьиКонцепции вычислений в современных науках о человеческом познанииConcepts of computations in modern theories of human cognitionМихайловИ. Ф.MikhailovI. F.ifmikhailov@gmail.comИнститут философии РАНРоссияRASRussian Federation20183006202101421Copyright © Михайлов И.Ф., 20212021Михайлов И.Ф.Mikhailov I.F.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://cyberspace.pgu.ru/jour/article/view/3

Исторический опыт развития когнитивных наук свидетельствует: большая часть проблем и возникающих вокруг них дискуссий выстраиваются вокруг двух опорных концептов: репрезентации и вычисления. Направления или «парадигмы» когнитивных дисциплин различаются в зависимости от признания или непризнания релевантности этих понятий для своих теорий, а также того или иного понимания природы соответствующих явлений. Поскольку репрезентации, если признаются и допускаются, то рассматриваются как необходимый элемент вычислительных процессов, то мы не ошибёмся, если скажем, что весь спектр когнитивных теорий выстраивается по отношению к опорному концепту вычислений - от принятия их в самой строгой (формально-символьной, тьюринговой) версии, через более «слабые» нетьюринговы концепции, к полному отрицанию применимости этого понятия к сфере познания и сознательного контроля. Ниже я попытаюсь проанализировать текущие подходы в когнитивной науке на предмет отнесения их к сильной или слабой версии компьютационализма - или к радикальному антикомпьютационализму.

As the history of cognitive science testifies, most of the problems and corresponding discussions are built around two basic concepts: representations and computations. The known schools, or ‘paradigms’, of cognitive disciplines differ depending on their adopting or denouncing the relevance of these concepts for their theories, as well as on a certain understanding of the nature of phenomena referred thereby. Since representations, if adopted and allowed, are considered a necessary element of computational processes, then we are not mistaken if we say that the entire spectrum of cognitive theories is aligned with the basic concept of computation - from accepting them in the strictest (formal-symbolic, Turing-style) versions, through more ‘weak’ non-Turing concepts, to a complete denial of the applicability of this concept to the sphere of cognition and conscious control. Below, I will try to analyze the current approaches in cognitive science with a view to classifying them as a strong or weak version of computationalism - or as a radical anti-computationalism

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.