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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">cyberspace</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Философские проблемы информационных технологий и киберпространства</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Philosophical Problems of IT &amp; Cyberspace (PhilIT&amp;C)</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2305-3763</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Пятигорский государственный университет</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.17726/philIT.2018.1.6</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">cyberspace-8</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Моделирование интеллекта: возможна ли осознанность без репрезентаций?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Modeling intelligence: is awareness without representations possible?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Михайлов</surname><given-names>И. Ф.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Mikhailov</surname><given-names>I. F.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><email xlink:type="simple">ifmikhailov@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Институт философии РАН</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Institute of Philosophy RAS</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>06</month><year>2021</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>92</fpage><lpage>102</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Михайлов И.Ф., 2021</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2021</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Михайлов И.Ф.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Mikhailov I.F.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://cyberspace.pgu.ru/jour/article/view/8">https://cyberspace.pgu.ru/jour/article/view/8</self-uri><abstract><p>С помощью предлагаемого текста я пытаюсь разобраться в проблеме соотношения сознания, осознания и самоосознания с точки зрения возможности их моделирования в искусственных средах. Сознание понимается как consciousness , т. е. как совокупность всех тех свойств, которые мы теряем, когда «теряем сознание» Осознание - как awareness, т. е. как свойство некоторых когнитивных процессов быть предметом внутреннего контроля. Я показываю, что для осуществления такого контроля необходимы механизмы памяти и внимания. Однако, согласно весьма распространённому мнению, осознание неразрывно связано с самоосознанием - философские основы этого убеждения восходят к Декарту и Канту. Основываясь на концепции репрезентации как необходимо упрощённой формы данных, которыми обмениваются вычислительные - в т. ч. когнитивные - процессы, я показываю нерелевантность этой точки зрения</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>With the help of the foregoing text, I try to deal with the problem of the relationship between consciousness, awareness and self- awareness with the view of their modelling in artificial media. Consciousness is understood as the totality of all those properties that we lose, when we ‘lose consciousness’. Awareness is the property of some cognitive processes to be the subject to internal control. I show that mechanisms of memory and attention are generally all that is needed for such monitoring. However, according to a very common opinion, awareness is inextricably linked with self-awareness, and the philosophical foundations of this belief date back to Descartes and Kant. Based on the concept of representation as a necessarily simplified form of data exchanged by computing (including cognitive) processes, I show the irrelevance of this point of view</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>сознание</kwd><kwd>осознание</kwd><kwd>репрезентация</kwd><kwd>вычисление</kwd><kwd>проприоцепция</kwd><kwd>осознание тела</kwd><kwd>когнитивная наука</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>consciousness</kwd><kwd>awareness</kwd><kwd>representation</kwd><kwd>computation</kwd><kwd>pro- prioception</kwd><kwd>bodily awareness</kwd><kwd>cognitive science</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Arp, R. Consciousness and Awareness. Switched-On Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey // Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14, No. 3, 2007</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Arp, R. Consciousness and Awareness. 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