IN DEFENSE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
Abstract
In this article I shall discuss the most influential and discussed non-physicalistic arguments, which became almost iconic in the last. Non physicalistic programs can be divided into negative and positive subprograms. There is the question “how physical processes in the brain cause mental experi- ences?” in the framework of the positive subprogram. In turn, the negative part is mean to critique the main arguments and the provisions of the physicalism. In this article I’m going to focus on the second negative subprogram. I will limit myself to outlining the arguments, which aim to demonstrate and defend phenomenal consciousness. Not having the opportunity to recount specific physicalistic positions and arguments, I would bring them during the review of the non-physicalistic arguments. The purpose of my work is rather mod-est – I’m going to do a review of the main non-physicalistic arguments, accom-panied by their respective explanatory commenting and, if possible, compact analysis. Adhering to the planned format of the research, I did not pursue the goal to provide this research with my own critical comments and suggestions, because it would not meet the scope of the article.
About the Author
D. E. Gasparyan
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
References
1. Leibniz G. The Monadology. University of Pittsburg Press, 1992
2. Chalmers D. J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford, 1996
3. Bealer G. Mental Properties // Journal of Philosophy. – 1994. – No 91. – P. 185-208.
4. Carruthers P. Phenomenal Consciousness. – Cambridge University Press, 2000.
5. Chalmers D. Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap // Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, eds. T. Alter and S. Walter. – Oxford University Press, 2006.
6. Dretske F. Naturalizing the Mind. – MIT Press, 1995.
7. Levin J. What is a Phenomenal Concept? // T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. – P. 15-31.
8. Levine J. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint // T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. P. 145-66.
9. Loar B. Phenomenal states // Philosophical Perspectives. – 1990. – No 4. – P. 81-108.
10. Papineau D. Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts // T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. – P. 111-44.
11. Revonsuo A. Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness // Consciousness and Cognition. – 1999. – No 8. – P. 173-185.
12. Rosenthal D. Explaining Consciousness // D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. – P. 406-21.
13. Rosenthal D.M. A theory of consciousness // Block N., Flanagan O., Güzeldere G., eds. The Nature of Consciousness. – MIT Press,1997.
14. Stoljar D. Physicalism and phenomenal concepts // Mind and Language. – 2005. – No 20. – P. 469-494.
15. Sturgeon S. The Epistemic View of Subjectivity // Journal of Philosophy. – 1994. – No 91. – P. 221-236.
16. Tye M. (2002), Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience’, Noûs, 36: 137–51; in B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-knowledge (Aldershot: Ashgate), 31–44.
17. Tye M. A theory of phenomenal concepts // Minds and Persons, ed. A. O’Hear. – Cambridge University Press, 2003.
18. Tye M. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. – MIT Press, 1995.
Review
For citations:
Gasparyan D.E. IN DEFENSE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. Philosophical Problems of IT & Cyberspace (PhilIT&C). 2013;(2):43-55. (In Russ.)
Views:
214
Email this article 