IN DEFENSE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (PART II)
Abstract
In this article I shall discuss the most influential and discussed non-physicalistic arguments, which became almost iconic in the last. Non physicalistic programs can be divided into negative and positive subprograms. There is the question “how physical processes in the brain cause mental experiences?” in the framework of the positive subprogram. In turn, the negative part is mean to critique the main arguments and the provisions of the physicalism. In this article I’m going to focus on the second negative subprogram. I will limit myself to outlining the arguments, which aim to demonstrate and defend phenomenal consciousness. Not having the opportunity to recount specific physicalistic positions and arguments, I would bring them during the review of the non-physicalistic arguments. The purpose of my work is rather modest - I’m going to do a review of the main non-physicalistic arguments, accompanied by their respective explanatory commenting and, if possible, compact analysis. Adhering to the planned format of the research, I did not pursue the goal to provide this research with my own critical comments and suggestions, because it would not meet the scope of the article.
About the Author
D. E. Gasparyan
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Gasparyan D.E. IN DEFENSE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS: ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (PART II). Philosophical Problems of IT & Cyberspace (PhilIT&C). 2014;(1):52-85. (In Russ.)
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